Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction, within the commonvalue paradigm, we analyze the asymptotic behavior of the transaction price as the number of bidders gets large. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges in probability to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we derive the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.
Motivation and Introduction
During the past half century, economists have made considerable progress in understanding the theoretical structure of equilibrium strategic behavior under market mechanisms, such as auctions; see Krishna [2010] for a comprehensive presentation and evaluation of progress.
One analytic device, commonly used to describe bidder motivation at single-object auctions, is a continuous random variable that represents individual-specific signals concerning the object's true, but unknown, value. This true, but unknown, value will be revealed only after the auction has ended, when the winner has been determined and the transaction price paid. Regardless of the winner, however, the value of the object is the same to all.
The conceptual experiment involves each potential bidder's receiving a draw from a signal distribution. Conditional on his draw, a bidder is then assumed to act purposefully, using the information in his signal along with Bayes' rule to maximize either the expected profit or the expected utility of profit from winning the auction. Another frequently-made assumption is that the signal draws of bidders are independent and that the bidders are ex ante symmetric-their draws coming from the same distribution of signals. This framework is often referred to as the symmetric common-value paradigm (symmetric CVP).
Under these assumptions, a researcher can then focus on a representative agent's decision rule when characterizing equilibrium behavior. Wilson [1977] invented this framework to illustrate that the winner's curse could not obtain, in equilibrium, among rational bidders. He also demonstrated that, when the number of bidders n is large (tends to infinity), the winning bid at first-price, sealedbid auctions converges almost surely to the true, but unknown, value of the object. In other words, the auction format and pricing rule play an important role in aggregating the disparate, individual pieces of information held by the bidders. Milgrom [1979] subsequently provided a precise characterization of the structure the signal distribution must possess in order for this convergence property to hold; Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have referred to this as full information aggregation.
When several, say k, units of a good are simultaneously for sale, at least two important questions arise: specifically, who will be the winning bidders and what price(s) will those winners pay? Weber [1983] has described a number of different multi-unit auction formats as well as pricing rules under those formats. For example, Milgrom [1981] developed a natural generalization of the Wilson [1977] model. In Milgrom's model, each bidder submits a price and the auctioneer then aggregates these demands, allocating the units to those bidders with the highest k submitted bids.
The winners then pay a uniform price-specifically, the highest rejected bid. Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] have built on this research by investigating a sequence of auctions {A r } in which both n r and k r increase. They demonstrated that a necessary and sufficient condition for full information aggregation is that k r → ∞ and (n r − k r ) → ∞, a condition they referred to as double largeness. Under this condition, non-negligible supply can be a substitute for the strong signal structure required in Wilson [1977] as well as Milgrom [1979 Milgrom [ , 1981 . Kremer [2002] has investigated this further.
While it is heartening to know there are conditions under which transaction prices will converge in probability to the true, but unknown, values of objects for sale, the rate at which these prices converge is also of interest. In particular, Hong and Shum [2004] asked the question "How large must n be to be large enough?" and then investigated the rates of information aggregation in common-value environments. Knowing the conditions under which the transaction price provides a potentially useful estimate of the object's unknown value is important to understanding the process some refer to as price discovery because, in practice, neither the number of bidders nor the number of units for sale at an auction ever really gets to infinity.
Of course, the pricing rule investigated in Wilson [1977] and Milgrom [1979 Milgrom [ , 1981 as well as Swinkels [1997, 2000] is not the only pricing rule that could be used under a sealed-bid format. For example, another pricing rule would involve allocating the k units to those bidders who tendered the highest k bids, but each winner would then pay what he bid for the unit(s) he won. In general, at multi-unit auctions, different auction formats and different pricing rules induce different equilibrium behavior and, thus, translate into different transaction prices as well as potentially different expected revenues for sellers. Hence, as Jackson and Kremer [2004 Kremer [ , 2006 have emphasized, understanding the effects of auction formats and pricing rules has important prac-tical relevance. Even small changes can have effects, as has been illustrated by Tsetlin [2008, 2009] .
In a companion paper to Milgrom and Weber [1982] , which was published nearly two decades later, Milgrom and Weber [2000] proposed another pricing rule for multi-unit, oral, ascendingprice auctions. The model considered by Milgrom and Weber [2000] is the multi-unit variant of the clock model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982] in order to investigate behavior at single-object, oral, ascending-price (often referred to as English) auctions. In the multi-unit model, bidders are assumed to demand at most one unit of the good for sale ; Milgrom [2004] has referred to this as singleton demand. The current price for all units on sale rises continuously according to some device, such as a clock. As the price rises, the drop-out prices of losing participants are recorded when they exit the auction. The transaction price is the drop-out price of the last participant to exit the auction. Each of the remaining k participants is then allocated one unit at the transaction price.
One attractive feature of oral, ascending-price auctions vis-à-vis sealed-bid ones, is the scope for information release at oral, ascending-price auctions. This is particularly important in informational environments with substantial common-value components. In such environments, by observing the actions of his competitors, a bidder can augment the information contained in his signal and, thus, may be able to reduce the uncertainty concerning the unknown value of the object for sale. Other things being equal, this reduction in uncertainty can induce participants to bid more aggressively than under sealed-bid formats, which means the revenues the seller can expect to garner can increase. The greater is the linkage between a bidder's information and what he perceives others will bid, the higher the bidding; Milgrom and Weber [1982] have referred to this as the linkage principle. In models of single-object auctions, they used it to rank the revenues a seller can expect to garner under the different auction formats and pricing rules. Specifically, in a theoretical model with one object for sale as well as risk-neutral potential buyers who have affiliated signals from the same marginal distribution, Milgrom and Weber [1982] demonstrated that the English auction format yields, on average, more revenue than first-price auctions, such as the oral, descending-price (Dutch) format or the first-price, sealed-bid format.
We compare the asymptotic behavior of transaction prices, and demonstrate that the asymptotic distributions of the transaction prices are Gaussian under both auction formats. But, the asymptotic variance of the transaction price under the Milgrom-Weber ascending pricing rule is less than that under the sealed-bid pricing rule used in Swinkels [1997, 2000] . Thus, if the transaction prices under different auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical estimators of the true, but unknown, value of the units for sale, then the ascending bid auction provides a more efficient estimator of the unknown value than the uniform-price, sealed-bid auction because more information is released with ascending bids than with sealed-bids. Note, however, that when the number of bidders is large, the differences both in the average transaction prices and in their asymptotic variances under the two auction formats are small, because they both converge to the true value.
One can deduce from the structure of the proof in Milgrom and Weber [1982] that the same linkage principle applies to the multi-unit auction we study in this paper. In theory, the linkage principle implies that the more information, aggregated in the price of the ascending bid auction than in the price of the sealed-bid auction, translates into higher seller expected revenue for the ascending bid auction. Such information difference becomes smaller when the number of bidders gets larger. However, it remains an empirical issue whether the revenue difference induced by the information structures across auction formats is economically significant. By estimating the variation of the signal distribution in our data set, we are able to empirically investigate the difference in the expected seller revenues between different multi-unit auction formats. To the best knowledge of ours, this work is among the first attempts to quantify the value of information in multi-unit auctions. We find that, for our particular data set, the loss in expected revenues by switching to the sealed-bid auction from the ascending bid auction is small, relative to both the transaction price and the estimated common value. Our results suggest that the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction format generates nearly as much seller revenues as the Milgrom-Weber auction format does. In this particular case, the auctioneer can do just as well by selling the objects using a Pesendorfer-Swinkels sealed-bid auction.
It is also worth mentioning that a continuum of equilibria exist in models of English auctions. For example, Bikhchandani et al. [2002] characterized the symmetric separating equilibria in the context of single-object English auctions. Similar multiple equilibria should also arise in the Milgrom-Weber model that we consider. Fortunately, the information aggregation result remains the same because the transaction price is determined in the last round of bidding, where the bid functions are the same across the equilibria. The bid functions in previous rounds can be different in different equilibrium: as long as bidders know about this and use this to invert out the signals, the true signals can still be recovered, which is what matters for the information set in the last stage. As pointed out in Bikhchandani et al. [2002] , the multiplicity of equilibrium, however, does affect how bids from the previous rounds of bidding are interpreted in an econometric procedure.
Our analysis in the estimation section relies on the Milgrom-Weber equilibrium. In the presence of multiple equilibria, while the price still consistently estimates the unknown true value, estimating the dispersion of the signal distribution is more difficult.
Our paper is in six additional sections. In the next, we use the Milgrom-Weber clock model to develop a theoretical framework within which to investigate the stochastic behavior of the transaction price at a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price auction within the common-value paradigm, while in section 3, we demonstrate that the transaction price converges in probability to the ex ante unknown, true value as the number of bidders n and the number of units k get large in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels sense. In section 4, we characterize the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price when both the number of bidders and the number of units get large. In section 5, we derive the likelihood function of observed drop-out prices, while in section 6, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China. In the final section, we summarize and conclude. Any details too cumbersome to be included in the text of the paper have been collected in the appendix at the end of the paper.
Theoretical Model
Consider an oral, ascending-price auction at which k units are for sale to a total of n bidders, each of whom wants at most one unit. Focus on the Milgrom and Weber [2000] pricing rule described in the introduction. Assume that each bidder draws an independently-and identically-distributed signal X, conditional on the true, but unknown, value v 0 . Denote the cumulative distribution and probability density functions of X, conditional on v, by F X|V (x|v) and f X|V (x|v), respectively. Denote by f V (v) the prior distribution of V, the unknown value.
Consider the vector of signals (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ), a random sample of n draws from F X|V (x|v 0 ).
Because this environment is symmetric, without loss of generality, focus below on bidder 1. Denote by Y i the i th ordered signal of the opponents of bidder 1, so
Denote by Z i the i th order statistic for all of the X i s, so
The auction proceeds in rounds m = n, n − 1, . . . , k + 1. In round m, m bidders continue to participate in the auction. The auction ends in round (k + 1) when the (k + 1) st bidder exits the auction. Without loss of generality, suppose that bidders are ordered in the reverse order of exit from the auction.
Let Ω m denote the information that has already been revealed in round m by all the bidders who have already left the auction. Hence, Ω m equals {z n , z n−1 , . . . , z m+1 }, where Ω n is the empty set ∅.
According to Milgrom and Weber [2000] , the symmetric equilibrium bidding rule in round m can be written as 
m (p)-the price level at which bidder 1 should exit-should satisfy the relation that
Hence, the functional form of the bid function.
The winning price corresponds to the bid submitted by the bidder with the (k+1) st order statistic of the signals during round (k + 1). Hence,
Limiting Information in the Transaction Price
In this section, and the next, we have two goals: first, to study the convergence rate of the transaction pricep to the unknown true common value v 0 ; and, second, to characterize the limiting distribution of the transaction pricep. In both of these endeavors, we assume that n gets large, tends to infinity.
In this regard, we make the following assumption concerning k, the number of units for sale relative to n, the number of bidders at the auction.
where τ is strictly between 0 and 1.
In words, the proportion of demand met has a stable limit as the number of bidders gets large. Were this not the case, then the transaction price would not have a stable limit, without some potentially unrealistic assumptions concerning f V (v), as was pointed out by Pesendorfer and Swinkels [1997] .
With regard to our goals, we proceed in two steps. In the first, we definev, the maximumlikelihood estimator (MLE) of v 0 , based on the unobserved (to the researcher, but known to the participants) order statistics z k+1 , . . . , z n , and then we investigate the rate at whichv converges to v 0 .
In the second, we investigate the rate at whichp converges tov. In the next section, we demonstrate formally that the rate of convergence of the pricep to the true common value v 0 will be driven (dominated) by the convergence rate ofv to v 0 . In other words,
understand the rate of information aggregation, it suffices to focus on howv approaches v 0 as the "sample size" n gets large.
Under our assumptions, the MLEv is defined aŝ
where the joint likelihood function of all the signals revealed under the Milgrom-Weber auction is proportional to
Here, the term 1 − F X|V (z k+1 |v) k captures the fact that only limited information is known concerning the signal values of the k winners-specifically, their signals are greater than z k+1 . Also, n k captures the fact that there are many ways in which the k highest order statistics of signals could exceed z k+1 . Equation (4) is the joint likelihood of the lowest (n − k) order statistics-those from z k+1 to z n .
Convergence of Price to the True Value
Given equation (4), the average log-likelihood will be a function of the lowest (n−k) order statistics.
A general function of order statistics can be difficult to analyze because of the potentially complex correlation structure among order statistics. One possibility is to appeal to the theory of L-statistics to investigate the convergence properties of functions of order statistics. Fortunately, this particular average log-likelihood function is more tractable than an L-statistic because it can be rewritten as a function of the entire sample and the sampleτ th quantile. Specifically,
n (τ) denote the empirical distribution function and the quantile function
With this definition, forτ = (n − k)/n,F −1 (τ) = z k+1 as long as z k+2 < z k+1 , which holds with probability 1 and which we assume for the rest of the paper with no loss of generality.
Now, under the assumptions made formal below, and becauseτ → τ, the sample percentilê 
For simplicity of notation we also define
In order for information to aggregate fully, Q 0 (v), as a function of v, must be uniquely maximized at v equal v 0 . As in the case of full-sample likelihood function, this can be verified using
Jensen's inequality. Thus, for any v not equal to
This can be shown by taking the sum of the following two inequalities. First, by Jensen's inequality,
Second, it is easy to see that
because the left-hand side, considered as a function of
This assumption mirrors a standard full-sample identification condition for likelihood analysis.
While the monotone likelihood-ratio condition used by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is required to derive the equilibrium bidding strategy, conditional on the form of the equilibrium bidding strategy, it is not strictly necessary for full information aggregation to hold.
The first inequality will be strict under the first condition in Assumption 2. Likewise for the second inequality under the second condition in Assumption 2. Thus, we have demonstrated that Q 0 (v) is globally and uniquely maximized at v 0 provided the value v identifies the signal distribu-tion f X|V (x|v) in the sense of Assumption 2, which is stronger than the usual full-sample identification condition whenever τ < 1. The usual Jensen's inequality argument for full-sample likelihood function is just a special case of the above when τ is one.
Now, examine the following first-order condition at v 0 :
Therefore, subject to the regularity conditions, which are outlined completely in the next section,
Given that Q 0 (v) is a properly-defined averaged log-likelihood function that depends linearly on the observed sample up to a given sample quantile and that the central sample quantiles are √ n-consistent as well as distributed asymptotically normal, the information equality then holds for v, and is related to the asymptotic variance ofv. Given the form of Q 0 (v), the expected Hessian is
Information-Matrix Equality
In full-sample likelihood models, the asymptotic variance of the maximum-likelihood estimator is usually calculated using an information-matrix equality. Here, we show that an analogous information-matrix equality also holds for the partial-sample information model that we consider, which we shall use to characterize the amount of limiting information contained in the price as an estimate of the true value.
One approach to calculating the information-matrix equality is to view the limiting first-order condition at v 0 as an identity, and then totally differentiate it with respect to v 0 . Specifically, because
for all possible values of v 0 , the derivative of this relation with respect to v 0 should also be zero.
This can be written as
In the next section, the second term on the left-hand side, which is the negative of the Hessian given in equation (6), will be shown to equal the asymptotic variance of the score function. The following provides a direct calculation of the second term in equation (7), which independently verifies equation (7) and facilitates the comparison with the variance of the score function in the next section.
To compute this term, we need to calculate
as well as ∂ ∂v
Both can be found by totally differentiating the identity
which leads to
Using these relations,
The next section formally demonstrates that the log-likelihood function of the partially-observed sample in our model has a similar statistical behavior to the usual full-sample log-likelihood function, so √ n v − v 0 will converge in distribution to a normal random variable whose asymptotic variance is the inverse of either
. We now need to
show that √ n (p −v) is o p (1) because, then, these will also represent the asymptotic variance of
For this purpose, we employ Bayesian asymptotic analysis. First, note that
where the likelihood of the conditioning event in the bid function is proportional to
Recall the definition in equation (4)
, which we can write, using a change of variables,
where
It is demonstrated in the next section that the above renormalized posterior distribution is asymptotically normal. Intuitively, √ n(p −v) p → 0 obtains because the mean of the above renormalized posterior distribution is asymptotically zero. It is also clear that the single-unit model of the English auction investigated by Milgrom and Weber [1982] is a special case of this resultwhen τ is one, which corresponds to the conventional full-sample maximum-likelihood analysis and Bayesian posterior distribution. At a typical English auction, where τ is one, the only difference from full-sample maximum-likelihood analysis is that the maximum order statistic is unobserved. However, a single order statistic is asymptotically negligible. Likewise, the conditioning event in the bid function in equation (8) differs from the corresponding partial-sample likelihood in equation (4) only by a single order statistic and the difference is asymptotically negligible.
Simple Example
Consider the following example, which can be solved in closed-form. Suppose that the conditional distribution of X is exponential, having mean v, so
The posterior distribution needed to compute the bid function in equation (1) is proportional to
Suppose f V (v) is a diffuse prior. 1 In this case, the above posterior distribution is then an inverse gamma distribution having parameters (n − k + 1) and m+1 j=n z j + mz , which has mean
which is also the bid function at round m. Therefore, the transaction price is given by the bid function with m equal (k + 1) and z equal z k+1 :
To see whyp converges to the true v 0 , note that in this example, Z k+1
X|V (τ) which equals −v 0 log (1 − τ). Also, by invoking a law of large numbers,
The maximum-likelihood estimatorv, which is the mode of the posterior distribution, iŝ
It can then be verified that
Asymptotic Distribution of Transaction Price
In this section, we provide formal conditions to justify the claims made in the previous section. Our analysis is broken into two parts: in the first, we derive the asymptotic distribution of
while in the second we show that √ n (p −v) is o p (1). As Newey and McFadden [1994] as well as Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] have pointed out, both parts depend on the stochastic equicontinuity properties of the sample-averaged log-likelihood functionQ n (v).
To begin, we state assumptions sufficient to the task. Instead of striving for the weakest possible set of assumptions, we are content with potentially overly-strong sufficient conditions that illustrate the main results. Note, too, that in theoretical models of auctions, the monotone likelihood-ratio condition is typically imposed, which restricts how weak the conditions for equicontinuity can be. 
Remark 1: In the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model, under the same assumption (k/n) → (1 − τ), only the signal of a single last-losing bidder is revealed, instead of the signals of all the losing bidders.
Therefore, intuitively, the transaction price in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model should aggregate less information than that in the Milgrom-Weber model. In fact, this turns out to be true. While the prices in both the Pesendorfer-Swinkels and the Milgrom-Weber models converge to v 0 at rate √ n, the asymptotic variance of the Pesendorfer-Swinkels price is greater than the Milgrom-
Weber price. We demonstrate this result formally using the influence function representation of the asymptotic variance. We note, first, from the proof of the theorem that Σ (τ) equals Var ψ 1 (X, τ)
where the influence function ψ 1 (X, τ) is given by
Next, we characterize the average log-likelihood function as well as the score and influence functions in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model, and show that they imply a variance larger than Σ (τ).
The average log-likelihood of the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model, which depends only on a single order statistic z k+1 =F −1 n (τ), is given bỹ
Its corresponding score function is
∂ ∂v
If we evaluate the first-order approximation of the score function with respect toF 
then we find the following influence function representation for the Pesendorfer-Swinkels score function:
Lettingp to denote the transaction price in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction model, we have
In order to show that Var ψ 2 (X, τ) ≤ Var ψ 1 (X, τ) , we compute
We can then easily verify that
Hence,
Furthermore, this inequality can be strengthened to a strict one inequality, Var ψ 1 (X, τ) > Var ψ 2 (X, τ)
as long as Var (ψ 1 (X, τ) − ψ 2 (X, τ)) > 0. This in turn holds when Remark 2: Above, we have indexed the asymptotic variance by τ, the proportion of losing bidders.
Intuitively, the larger the fraction of losing bidders, the more information revealed at the auction.
Therefore, we expect Σ (τ) to be a monotonically decreasing function of τ, in a matrix sense. In other words, for any 0 < τ 1 ≤ τ 2 < 1,
This also turns out to be true. To wit, for τ 1 > τ 2 , Var ψ 1 (X, τ 1 ) ≤ Var ψ 1 (X, τ 2 ) . This will, in turn, follow from
Verifying equation (12) is tedious, but straightforward: it depends on the following two key rela-
and, second, that, for τ 1 > τ 2 ,
Hence, under the assumptions made above, especially the common support Assumption 4, for 0 < τ < 1, the larger is τ, the more information is aggregated in the Milgrom-Weber model, in the sense of having a smaller variance despite that the rate of convergence stays the same. It can also be shown that this conclusion continues to hold without the support Assumption 4. When the upper support is increasing in v, while the condition still holds, the rate of convergence can improve beyond √ n when τ equals one. On the other hand, if the lower support is also increasing in v, then it is possible that the convergence rate is faster than √ n even when τ is zero. In this case, while there will be no information loss when τ increases above zero, there may be no additional asymptotic information either until τ becomes one.
This desirable monotonicity property of information aggregation in the Milgrom-Weber model is in contrast to the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model. The amount of information aggregated asymptotically in the price of the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model is not monotonic in τ. For example, when f X|V x|v 0 is uniform in X, the worst τ for information aggregation is one-half in the PesendorferSwinkels model, because this involves the worst balance between the winner's curse and the loser's curse. In general, the optimal τ in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model obviously depends on the shape of this conditional density. Intuitively, in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels model, a different τ selects a different information set, while in the Milgrom-Weber model, a larger τ always selects a larger information set.
Deriving Likelihood Function of Observed Drop-Out Prices
In section 2, we derived the bid function of a representative bidder as well as characterized the transaction price; see equations (1) and (3). In sections 3 and 4, we then demonstrated that the transaction price converged in probability to the true, unknown value v 0 and derived its asymptotic distribution. To provide a framework within which to conduct our empirical analysis in section 6, in this section, we derive the likelihood function of the bid data observed by an econometrician.
We highlight the fact that the sampling variability of the econometrician's estimate of the true, but unknown value v 0 will depend on nuisance parameters unknown to the econometrician.
We first introduce some additional notation. We denote byp j the j th drop-out price, so j = 1, 2, . . . , n − k. For example, in our empirical application, we have n equal forty bidders and k equal twenty units, so there are twenty drop-out prices, the last being the transaction price, which we denoted above byp, but now denote asp n−k . Thus, our observables are (p 1 ,p 2 , . . . ,p n−k−1 ,p n−k ). Now, from equation (2), we can recover the signal consistent with the first bidder's drop-out priceviz.,z
Likewise, for each of j = 2, 3, . . . , n − k, we can recursively recoverz j , the signals of the (n − k − 1) losing bidders, soz
For the k bidders who win the auction, all we know is that Z j exceeds β
). In the general case, the bid function β m (x) in equation (1) takes the following form:
If we assume that f V (v) is diffuse and that X given v is normal, having mean v and variance σ 2 , then we can write
To summarize, under the assumptions of normality as well as a diffuse prior,
Consider (z n ,z n−1 , . . . ,z k+1 ), the vector of (n − k) signals consistent with the observed drop-out prices as well as the transaction price. The joint likelihood function of all the signals consistent with the drop-out prices revealed under the Milgrom-Weber auction is
Here, θ denotes a vector of unknown parameters, and captures the fact the probability density and cumulative distribution functions of signals can depend on parameters known to the bidders, but unknown to the econometrician.
The econometrician's MLEṽ is defined as
whereθ denotes the MLE of θ 0 . While knowing the true nuisance parameters in θ 0 is unimportant in demonstrating that the transaction price converges in probability to the true, unknown value v 0 , because the parameters contained in θ 0 are of second-order importance, the nuisance parameters are critical when calculating an estimate of the sampling variation inṽ, the econometrician's estimate of the true, but unknown value v 0 .
In 
Empirical Application
We have applied the methods described above to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China in October 2007. At this auction, the municipal transportation bureau sold 2, 000 additional red taxi license plates. Red taxis are special in Shenzhen because they can operate both inside and outside the Special Economic Zone (SEZ), unlike yellow taxis which can operate only inside the SEZ, and green taxis which can only operate outside the SEZ.
The city of Shenzhen had not issued any new license plates for red taxis since 1993. However, rapid growth in Shenzhen's population meant that patrons were experiencing a shortage of taxis, leading to an increase in the number of illegally-operated taxis. In 2007, the per capita number of taxis in Shenzhen was low when compared to other parts of China: only 10, 305 taxis were licensed in a city of 7.5 million permanent residents, about 13.74 taxis for every 10, 000 residents.
The Ministry of Construction in China recommended that cities should have 21 taxis for every 10, 000 residents.
Before the auction, the authorities reviewed the qualifications of all those who had applied to participate at the auction. Potential bidders could be individual taxi companies or groups formed by different companies. While fifty-one 'firms' apparently requested to participate, only forty potential bidders were certified to participate at the auction. Thus, n was 40.
In written documentation, potential bidders were reminded to be aware of the risks involved.
For example, consider a translation of the text from one document:
Following this auction, more taxi license plates will be issued through auction or other ways over the next four years. The number of taxis in Shenzhen will reach about 20, 000 by 2011. The issuance of a great number of license plates might have much impact on the taxi industry.
Despite these warnings, representatives of taxi companies in the city showed great interest in the auction, perhaps because operating a taxi has been one of the highest profit margins in the transportation industry. Also, historically, taxis have provided a stable return against investment.
Before the auction, 53 out of 73 taxi companies in Shenzhen owned between 50 to 200 taxis each. To wit, the majority of the city's taxi companies were small-and medium-sized ones. Some incumbent taxi drivers expressed concern that entry would erode profits. One was quoted in the local newspaper (our translation) as saying that Actually we are not earning much nowadays. If more taxis were on the road, we would have a hard time making ends meet.
In contrast, local residents supported the issuance of additional license plates. One was quoted (again our translation from the local newspaper) as saying
The sooner new taxis hit the road the better. It's too hard to hail a taxi during peak hours and holidays.
This anecdotal evidence, along with casual observation, suggests to us that the value of a redtaxi license plate in Shenzhen has a large common-value component. Before the auction, however, this common value was unknown to potential bidders. Using whatever means at their disposal, potential bidders formed estimates of the unknown common value which they then used during bidding at the auction.
The auction in Shenzhen proceeded according to the rules described in Milgrom and Weber [2000] . In written rules announced before the auction, the authorities informed potential bidders that the 2, 000 license plates on sale would be distributed evenly among the final twenty highest bidders; each winner would be required to buy 100 license plates.
The auctioneer, Tian Tao, was a registered member of China's auction industry association.
The reserve price was set at 150, 000 yuan per license plate, but the price rose to 500, 000 yuan in fourth minute of bidding. During the auction, Tian reminded bidders repeatedly to be aware of the risks involved. In fact, Tao took a break for ten minutes to allow the bidders "to cool their enthusiasm." We have translated one of his comments as "this is one of the most intensive auctions I've experienced in my career as an auctioneer." At the close of the auction, the price of a red-taxi license plate was 542, 500 yuan, around US$80,000.
In table 1, we present the prices called out during the auction along with the number of bidders who exited the auction at those prices, while in figure 1 we depict the empirical survivor function of prices. The units in this and others table are in 10, 000 yuan.
Zhang Hongzhi, a manager of Shenzhen Xilie Taxi Company, was reported in the newspaper to have said that he "felt very excited after we won a bid." Before his attending the auction, his company had decided on 550, 000 yuan as the highest they would pay for a red-taxi license plate.
To implement equation (4), we assumed that X, conditional on v 0 , is distributed normally, having variance σ 2 , so
We also assumed that f V (v) is a diffuse prior. In table 2, we present the MLEs of v 0 and σ as well as their standard errors; the logarithm of the likelihood function for this empirical specification is −55.98. Here, the units of the parameters estimates are in 10, 000 yuan.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that despite the same rate of convergence, the asymptotic variance of the transaction price is smaller in the Milgrom-Weber auction than in the PesendorferSwinkels auction. Since the probability of being truncated less than zero in the normal distribution of signals given the value is very small at the estimated parameters, these asymptotic variances can be computed by a back of the envelope calculation using the estimated variance for the normal distribution. The asymptotic variance for the Milgrom-Weber transaction price, given in Theorem 1 and equation (7) is, for Z ∼ N (0, 1),
, which when τ = 1/2 is 2πσ 2 π+2
. On the other hand, the asymptotic variance for the PesendorferSwinkels transaction price in (11) is given by
, which when τ = 1/2 is 2πσ 2 4
, 29% larger than the Milgrom-Weber variance. The extent to which this difference in the asymptotic variance translates into the difference in the expected seller revenue, however, depends also on the variance of the prior value function.
In order to better understand the implications of these parameter estimates, we used these parameters to simulate the differences between the prices in a Milgrom-Weber auction and a Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction. A subset of these results are reported in table 3. Each entry in the table provides the difference in the expected revenue between the Milgrom-Weber auction and the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction, measured in units of 10,000 yuan. In calculating table 3, we need three parameters: the prior mean and variance of the common value distribution as well as the variance of the signal distribution conditional on the common value. We used the estimate of v 0 to specify the prior mean, the estimate of σ to specify the variance of the signal distribution, and we vary the prior variance of the value distribution as a proportion of the signal variance.
As predicted by the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber [1982] , the Milgrom-Weber auction always generates an higher expected revenue than the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction. However, as table 3 illustrates, the difference in the expected revenues is relatively small when compared to both the selling price and the estimated common value. Table 3 also reveals that at the estimated parameters, the revenue difference is decreasing in the number of objects for a given number of bidders. This is because as the number of losing bidders decreases, relatively less information is being revealed in the Milgrom-Weber auction than in the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction. As the prior variance of the value distribution increases relative to the variance of the signal distribution, indicating a larger variation of the common value component, the revenue difference also increases.
Summary and Conclusions
Using a clock model of a multi-unit, oral, ascending-price, auction, within the common-value paradigm, under the Milgrom-Weber pricing rule, we have analyzed the asymptotic behavior of the transaction price as the number of bidders and the number of units get large. We have demonstrated that even though the transaction price is determined by a (potentially small) fraction of losing drop-out bids, that price converges almost surely to the ex ante unknown, true value. Subsequently, we have demonstrated that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian.
We also demonstrated that the asymptotic variance of the transaction price under the MilgromWeber pricing rule is less than that under the pricing rule used by Pesendorfer and Swinkels. Thus, if the transaction prices under different auction formats and pricing rules are viewed as statistical estimators of the true, but unknown, value of the units for sale, then the Milgrom-Weber pricing rule is a more efficient estimator of the unknown value than the uniform-price, sealed-bid rule because more information is released under the Milgrom-Weber rule than under sealed-bid ones.
Note, however, that when the number of bidders is large, the difference both in the average trans-action prices and in their asymptotic variances under the two auction formats and pricing rules are small, because they both converge to the true value. Finally, we applied our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China. We find that the loss in the expected revenue by switching to the sealed-bid auction from the ascending bid auction is small, relative to both the transaction price and the estimated common value. Our study suggests that the Pesendorfer-Swinkels auction format can generate nearly as much seller revenues as the MilgromWeber auction format does for our particular data set.
Proof of Main Theorem
The proof involves verifying two high-level conditions in Newey and McFadden [1994] as well as Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] . The first condition delivers consistency, while the second delivers asymptotic normality ofv and the relation that √ n (p −v) is o p (1). We first state these conditions within the context of our notation.
Condition 1 For any
δ > 0, there exists an ǫ > 0, such that lim inf n→∞ P *        sup |v−v 0 |≥δ Q n (v) −Q n v 0 ≤ −ǫ        = 1.
Condition 2 There exists
ii. For any sequence δ n → 0, Under conditions 1 and 2, it is shown in Theorem 1 in Chernozhukov and Hong [2003] that for h and p n (h) defined in Equation (9),
for any α > 0, where φ h; 0, J 0 −1 Ω 0 J 0 −1 denotes a normal density with mean 0 and variance
In other words, the convergence of p n (h) to a normal limiting density is in any polynomial moments and is stronger than convergence in the total variation norm. Using Equation 9, this implies that 
, first note that the individual terms in the summand of the second term consist of the product of log f X|V (X i |v) and
, where ξ represents a generic argument that will be evaluated atξ =F
Assumption 4, the first is a type II function and the second is a type I function defined in Andrews [1994] . Both satisfy Pollard's entropy condition, and are stable under multiplication. Hence,
is a Lipschitz function in ξ and the Lipschitz constant is uniform in v. Hence, given thatF
Therefore, the second term ofQ n (v) converges uniformly in v to the second term of Q 0 (v). The first term ofQ n (v) is also a Lipschitz function ofF −1 n (τ) with the Lipschitz constant being uniform in v. Therefore, by the same argument, the first term ofQ n (v) also converges uniformly in v to the first term of Q 0 (v). Hence, Condition 1 holds.
The second condition is more involved than the first. We defineξ to beF as equation (10), we can compute that By inspection, we see that its inverse coincides with the asymptotic variance given in Σ (τ), which has been verified to equal J 0 in the information matrix equality calculation and, hence, is also positive definite. Its inverse yields the asymptotic variance of √ n p − v 0 and √ n v − v 0 . 
